The claimant in Cong Su operated a biscotti machine for her employer. While operating the machine, her hand came into contact with a sharp blade causing severe injuries.
To prevent a hand from entering the area where the blade was housed, a metal guard was on the machine. The metal guard was designed to keep the workers’ hands nine inches from the metal blade.
The claimant filed a civil suit against the maker of the machine and her employer. The employer (David’s Cookies) moved to dismiss her claims, arguing that the claimant’s remedy was through the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act.
In the civil suit, the claimant produced an expert who opined about the safety devices on the biscotti machine. According to the claimant’s expert, the metal guard protecting the operator’s hands was insufficient: a worker could easily slip their hand under the metal guard, through a one-and-one-half inch gap and into the cutting blade. Further, petitioner's expert testified that the claimant was illiterate, and was unable to read any warning signs or messages (also, the claimant spoke no English). Finally, it was argued that the claimant injured her hand on the first day on the job, and was inadequately trained to operate the biscotti machine.
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A recent New Jersey Appellate Division decision, Campbel v. Shrewsbury Surgicenter, may have a significant impact on commercial premises liability matters within the context of available insurance coverage. The decision was based upon a dispute between the insurer of a commercial tenant and a landlord who was named as an "additional insured" on the tenant's policy. Under the facts, the court found that the landlord was entitled to coverage under the tenant's policy. However, the significant aspect of the decision relates to the court's additional conclusion regarding primacy of coverage. Based upon the types of policies involved and language of the respective policies' "other insurance" clauses, the court also held that the coverage afforded to the landlord as an additional insured under the tenant's policy was only excess to the primary coverage provided under the landlord's own insurance policy. Read More...

The New Jersey Supreme Court last Monday was asked to explode the legal fiction in UIM cases that the driver who caused the accident, not the plaintiff's auto insurance carrier who declined coverage, is the defendant. The plaintiff in Bardis v. First Trenton Ins. Co., was injured in a parking lot collision with an underinsured driver. First Trenton paid PIP benefits, but declined UIM coverage. When the plaintiff sued, he requested a jury instruction that First Trenton be the named defendant, which was refused. The jury found that the other driver's negligence did not cause the accident, thereby extinguishing the UIM claim. The Appellate Division affirmed and the Supreme Court subsequently agreed to review the case. It is the Plaintiff's argument that had the jury known of the PIP benefit payments, it could have concluded that the carrier agreed the injuries were caused by the other driver's negligence. At argument, the Justices seemed to be concerned about the possibility that if insurers feel the payment of PIP benefits might lead to subsequent UIM liability, they will have "second thoughts." This suggests the Court may affirm the Appellate Division. However, given the Court's general penchant for ruling against carriers, the decision could go either way. In any event, the decision will have important implications for auto carriers doing business in New Jersey, and we will provide and update upon receiving the opinion.

Video surveillance is often relied upon by the defense in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation cases to either challenge credibility or to demonstrate that a claimant is not as disabled as he appears from his own testimony or his doctor’s examination. A recent case (Gross v. Neptune) has been relied upon by plaintiff’s attorneys to limit the introduction of videotape evidence in contested workers’ compensation trials in New Jersey. Read More...

A New Jersey appeals court has upheld a no-cause verdict in a negligence suit against a woman whose child injured another child during backyard play while under her supervision. The Appellate Division, in Kane v. Hatch, said the trial judge correctly invoked the parental immunity doctrine, which gives parents a high degree of autonomy in making subjective decisions to carry out their duties and which applies to third-party suits. The defendant "neither placed the children at risk nor exposed them to a commonly inherent danger so as to fall outside the traditional realm of child rearing and therefore outside the protective mantle of the parental immunity doctrine," the judges wrote. The defendant's son was playing tee ball with a wooden bat with two girls, including the plaintiff's daughter. The defendant was supervising from a porch seven feet away. Though the defendant warned the girls to stay away, the boy struck one of the girls with the bat above the eye, causing a scar. Her mother sued the defendant, alleging negligent supervision. The Appellate Division held that the trial court properly instructed the jury to weigh the defendant's conduct against the willful and wanton standard of liability. Parental immunity "protects parents from having to defend against judgment that may be construed as poor or negligent, so long as it is an honest error of judgment that is not wanton or willful." While parental immunity is typically invoked by a parent in a matter involving the injury of their own child, the court applied it here in the third-party context, providing what could be a useful defense for liability insurers, depending upon the circumstances.

In a case of first impression, the Appellate Division held that where a public entity settles with an injured plaintiff for an at-work injury, the plaintiff's independent contractor-employer is not entitled to a credit for workers compensation payments in a subsequent indemnity suit by the public entity. In Serpa v. New Jersey Transit, a construction worker was severely injured while working on a train station owned by New Jersey Transit -- a publicly owned concern. He received some $900,000 in workers' compensation payments from his employer, the general contractor for the job. New Jersey Transit paid the plaintiff $1.5 million to settle a personal injury suit, wherein the employer was named as a third-party defendant on an indemnity claim. The employer's attorney agreed on the record that the $1.5 million was a reasonable settlement. However, after being apportioned 85% of the fault at trial on the indemnity issue, the employer sought a credit for its workers compensation payments. The trial court declined the requested relief and the Appellate Division affirmed. The court held that N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(e) precludes reimbursement to an employer from a public entity tortfeasor. Rather, the public entity or public employee receives a credit for the workers compensation payments, if a judgment is entered. Thus, in a settlement, a public entity cannot reasonably be expected to pay full value for a claim, knowing that if the case goes to trial, it will receive a credit against the damage verdict for the workers' compensation payments. This was not accounted for by the employer in consenting to the reasonableness of the settlement.

Ultimately, the lesson taught by Serpa for carriers with insureds who work with public entities is that the public entity's right to a credit for workers compensation payments made to injured employees must be taken into account before conceding as to whether a settlement proposal is reasonable. In this case, counsel for the employer should have argued that a settlement of $600,000 was appropriate.

In a case decided August 12, 2008, the Appellate Division held that where a personal injury protection benefits insurer has paid benefits to its inured, it is entitled to reimbursement of those benefits from the insurance proceeds of a third-party tortfeasor pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, even if the limits of the tortfeasor's insurance policy are insufficient to make the insured whole. In Fernandez v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which is approved for publication, the court resolved a perceived conflict between two prior opinions on this topic. Specifically, the court found that IFA Ins. Co. v. Waitt -- often relied upon by injured parties for the proposition that their recovery preempts a PIP carrier's reimbursement action -- holds only that recovery cannot be had against the tortfeasor's liability insurer for more than its policy limits. The court further held that Knox v. Lincoln General Ins. Co. controlled and requires that the PIP carrier take priority over the injured party in recovering from the tortfeasor.

As a practical matter, this case should be cited by any PIP carrier seeking reimbursement for payments, especially when there is resistance on the basis that there is a pending personal injury case. The Appellate Division has made clear that there is no reason for a PIP reimbursement arbitration to await the outcome of the underlying tort case.

In the well known Rova Farms decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a liability insurer who in bad faith refuses to accept a plaintiff's reasonable settlement demand, will be liable for the amount of any judgment above and beyond the insured's policy limits. In an opinion approved for publication on June 30, 2008, the Appellate Division held that a UM carrier cannot be exposed to Rova Farms liability in refusing to settle with an insured. The court in Taddei v. State Farm, was faced with a case where the plaintiff/insured made a settlement demand after non-binding UM arbitration of $87,500. A jury eventually awarded the plaintiff $2.6 million. However, the trial judge molded the verdict to the $100,000 policy limit. On appeal , the plaintiff argued that the carrier had acted in bad faith, in light of the refusal to settle. The Appellate Division was un-persuaded, reasoning that the Rova Farms bad faith model is inapplicable in the UM and UIM context because the insured is the claimant and, therefore, not exposed to an award in excess of the policy limit.

In the case of Bolz v. Bolz, a published opinion relapsed in May 2008, the Appellate Division examined the combined effect of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3; the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law (JTCL), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to -5; and the Comparative Negligence Act (CNA), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.17, when there is a collision between a private automobile and an automobile that is owned by a public entity and driven by a public employee. It was held that despite the fact that a public entity is not liable to pay damages unless plaintiff sustained a permanent injury as defined in the TCA, both drivers are deemed “tortfeasors” if they are found to have been negligent and their negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.

Therefore, allocation or apportionment of each driver’s negligence or fault must be assessed, even if there is a possibility that the public entity may not be liable for damages. Put a different way, although no damages can be awarded against a public entity or employee for pain and suffering if the injuries caused by an accident do not meet the threshold set by the TCA, the public employee is, nonetheless, a tortfeasor pursuant to JTCL and the CNA and this affects the judgment against the private tortfeasor.

In a decision released June 10, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, fashioned on the liability set out in Portee v. Jaffee, is independent of the requirements imposed by the Automobile Insurance Cost Recovery Act's verbal threshold. The Court in Jablonowska v. Suther, determined that the New Jersey Legislature provided no indication in drafting AICRA that it intended to superimpose the permanent injury requirement on Portee claims that happen to involve the use of a motor vehicle. Accordingly, when asserting a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in motor vehicle cases, plaintiffs will not have to submit objective medical evidence of a permanent psychological injury. Nor will they have to file a certification of permanency from a physician.

In Penn National v. Costa, decided April 29, 2008, the Appellate Division reversed the Law Division's denial of the motion for summary judgment by the defendant/third-party plaintiff homeowner's insurer and remanded for the entry of judgment for the homeowner's insurer and against the plaintiff automobile insurer in a coverage action for injuries sustained by the third-party defendant when he slipped on ice and hit his head on the vertical post of the jack being used to replace a tire on his employer's pickup truck in the employer's driveway. Read More...

A tavern may be liable for negligence if it makes no effort to keep a visibly drunk patron safe, even though his drinking may have been done elsewhere. In a case of first impression, the Appellate Division held in Bauer v. Nesbitt, decided March 20, 2008, that a bar owner can be sued for failing to prevent a patron from getting into a car with another patron who was visibly intoxicated and later caused the passenger's death. The court held that if the bar's employees should have recognized that the passenger was drunk, even if he was not served alcohol there (the passenger only drank a Coke at the bar), there was a duty to protect him from foreseeable injury as the result of an automobile accident by insuring he did not drive and that he did not ride as a passenger with a patron who was similarly impaired. This is the first decision holding that if a patron becomes visibly intoxicated and the bar's employees know or should have known, the patron should not be permitted to leave without trying to find safe transportation.

The sponsor of a measure to expand damages in wrongful death cases, vetoed by Gov. John Corzine because it could fall heavily on public defendants, has reintroduced it and plans to tailor the bill to the Governor's concerns. The bill would amend the Wrongful Death Act to allow recovery for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society and loss of companionship. Those damages would be available to to those entitled to intestate succession of the decedent's personal property, namely spouses, children and parents. Presumably, the new bill will give judges authority to strike or reduce "excessive" non-pecuniary damage awards. The newly introduced bill has been assigned to the Senate Judiciary Committee. However, no action is predicted until the fall, after the budget process is completed and the Legislature takes its summer recess.

Following a series of unfavorable rulings in the Appellate Division over the past few years, New Jersey courts were generally of the view that biomechanical experts could not be called upon by defendants to opine that a minor automobile accident could not have possibly caused a serious medical condition. However, on March 6, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court announced its decision on Hisenaj v. Kuehner, ___ N.J. ____ (2008), reversing an appellate court that overstepped its bounds in throwing out the report of Harold Alexander, PhD., based upon the conclusion that it was not supported by reliable scientific methodology. Thus, the defendants were left with the prospect of facing exposure for significant medical treatment, including spinal surgery, for a motor vehicle collision occurring at less than ten miles per hour. However, the Supreme Court found that the studies Dr. Alexander relied upon, as opposed to those used for support in prior cases, included similar accidents and similar victims in terms of age, gender and physical composition. Thus, the opinions offered were sufficiently supported by scientific data for admissibility.

This was an important victory for insurance carriers in New Jersey, as juries will no longer be left to determine whether low impact collisions correlate to serious medical conditions, especially in the spine, which often times are pre-existing. However, it remains important for defense counsel to insist that their biomechanical experts rely upon the most recent and up-to-date empirical evidence.

TMWB maintains an extensive automobile liability defense practice, representing insureds on personal auto, as well as commercial policies.

Passengers in stolen cars who are unaware the vehicles are being driven without the owner's permission may collect PIP and UIM insurance if they're injured in an automobile accident, the Appellate Division has ruled. In Hardy v. Abdul-Martin, the appeals court reversed a grant of summary judgment to an insurance company that denied coverage in such a circumstance under an exclusion in the insurance contract. The court said, "A passenger cannot be expected to inquire upon entry into a vehicle, as to the status of the car and driver, unless existing facts place the passenger on notice that the use of the car is questionable."

In Agha v. Feiner, decided by the Appellate Division on December 18, 2007, a jury verdict following a trial on damages only in an automobile negligence action was reversed and remanded for the entry of a judgment for the defendants based on a violation of the principles set forth in Brun v. Cardoso . Neither of the plaintiff's two expert witnesses (anesthesiologist and chiropractor) was qualified to read MRI films, but both testified about whether the plaintiff had a herniation; this was "a classic case of bootstrapping otherwise inadmissible MRI reports into evidence"; furthermore, this case "starkly presents the need for cross-examination of the doctor who read the MRI." This case again highlights the importance of retaining a qualified physician to testify concerning objective testing results, and will apply equally to defendants who fail to retain a radiologist or similarly competent expert.

A coalition of medical groups led by the Medical Society of New Jersey has succeeded in getting a temporary delay in the enforcement of a new list of fee limits for treatment of injured motorists under personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. Read More...

Governor Jon S. Corzine has signed a bill, supported by both the New Jersey State Bar Association and the Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey, banning "step-down" clauses in commercial auto insurance policies. The clauses, in effect sanctioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court's 2005 decision Pinto v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co., said drivers not specifically listed in a commercial policy would be limited to the uninsured and under-insured motorist benefits in their personal policies, not the policy of the company for which they were driving. The practice was argued as unfair to both the business paying premiums for full coverage and to new employees who, through no fault of their own, weren't listed on the policy. The bill, S-1666, was passed unanimously by both houses of the legislature and was sponsored by Senator Nicholas P. Scutari (D-Union), a trial lawyer whose practice includes personal injury.

Upon the occurrence of a workplace injury involving industrial machinery or equipment, it is often the case that an employee will sue the manufacturer of the machine as a companion to his/her Workers’ Compensation petition. At the same time, the employer might seek to effectuate changes in order to make the culpable machine safer for employee operation. However, before any such changes are made, careful consideration must be given to the potential for a claim for “spoliation evidence” against the employer. Read More...